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Architects of the United Nations Global Compact argue that this “learning network” will 
encourage transnational corporations to adhere to international norms.  The arrangement 
grows from a recognition that power in the international system is shifting from states to 
non-state actors, and in particular to transnational corporations.  Because states are 
currently charged with enforcing international agreements, this power shift creates an 
important dilemma for international law and for global governance more generally.  This 
chapter explores the structure and operation of the Global Compact to evaluate its 
impacts on corporate practices and global governance. It argues that the failure of the 
Global Compact to address power imbalances among global actors limit its ability to 
bring corporate practices into line with global human rights and other norms.  More 
importantly, the Global Compact marginalizes civil society actors in ways that undermine 
the legitimacy of the global institutional order.  Effective and democratic global 
governance will require attempts to strengthen the authority of public institutions and 







Numerous analysts identify fundamental tensions between two competing visions of how 
the world should be organized (Ayres 2004; Elson 2004; Khagram 2004).  On one side 
are economic globalizers, who believe the best way to improving the human condition is 
through economic growth and the creation of globalized markets.  On the other side is 
what I have referred to elsewhere (Smith 2008) as “democratic globalizers,” or 
collections of individuals and organizations articulating preferences for a global order 
governed by principles of human rights and democratic governance.  Table 1 displays the 
key participants, goals, and values that underlie each vision. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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As Elson observes, "[t]he human rights system treats people as ends in themselves, 
valued simply because they are human beings.  The corporate profits system treats people 
as instruments for making money, valued through a financial calculus of profit and loss" 
(Elson 2004:45).  Although many proponents of the business model might argue that 
they, too, value human rights, they view unregulated markets and the economic growth as 
the only effective means of obtaining such rights.  Human rights and environmental 
protection are seen as “trickle down” effects of a growing economy.  Democratic 
globalizers counter such “market fundamentalist” (Stiglitz 2003) arguments by pointing 
to evidence contesting the links between market liberalization and growth and observing 
the undemocratic nature of markets (Cavanagh and Mander 2004; Couch 2004; Gray 
1998; UNDP 2005).  They want an economy that is governed by social norms of equity, 
human rights, and sustainability.  In other words, rather than treating society as a support 
system for the global economy, they want global governance that subordinates the 
economy to the needs of society (Chase-Dunn 2006; Elson 2004; Munck 2002;  Polanyi, 
1944). 
These two competing visions have come into sharp contrast during the late 1980s 
and 1990s, as the economic globalizers succeeded in advancing their vision of 
globalization in important ways (Sklair 1997).  In the process, they generated new threats 
to democracy and other social values, thereby fueling the mobilization of opponents to 
their market-dominant model of global integration.  By the late 1990s, meetings of global 
trade and financial ministers were met with massive public protests by citizens 
demanding a stronger role in determining national and global economic policies (Broad 
and Hecksher 2003; Rucht 2003).  The editors of this volume have urged us to explore 
the possibilities for reconciling these two visions of globalization, noting that "it is 
important to bind business to global policy processes in such a way that the interests of 
business and citizens more generally are aligned to the maximum extent possible" 
(chapter 1, p. 1).   
The Global Compact (GC) is an initiative that was ostensibly designed to help 
with this alignment of interests by integrating businesses into the United Nations 
Framework as “partners.”  Elson describes this approach as representing a "third way" 
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politics that has emerged in the early 21st century to advance cooperative “partnerships” 
between governments and private sector actors to address global problems.  This 
approach “see[s] no fundamental contradictions between the hope of human rights and 
the exigencies of competitive capital accumulation” (Elson 2004:46).  Proponents of the 
Global Compact say it can give a “human face” to the global market.  But given the 
different starting assumptions and goals of the two competing visions of democracy, and 
especially in light of evidence that sees global markets as contributing to rising inequality 
and environmental degradation (Khagram 2004;  e.g., UNDP 2005), we must ask whether 
the Global Compact is really up to the task with which it is charged.  If market expansion 
contributes to the economic and political power wielded by transnational corporations, 
and if no effective system of governance is being built to monitor and mitigate the 
harmful effects of globalized markets, then the Global Compact merely helps enhance 
corporate dominance and to legitimate anti-social corporate practices. 
 In the introduction to this volume (p. 2) the editors argued that civil society efforts 
to counteract corporate dominance in the global system should emphasize negotiation and 
compromise with business actors as a means of generating durable forms of global 
governance.  While certainly nonviolent negotiation is preferred to more destructive 
forms of confrontation, the United Nations and governments have an important role to 
play in helping foster the kind of negotiation and compromise that can lead to sustainable 
and humane global governance.  Analysts and practitioners need to recognize the 
tremendous inequities in power that will prevent business “partners” from participating in 
negotiations that they see as harming their ability to maximize profits.  If, as many 
analysts argue, it is the profit-seeking logic that drives corporate practices that contribute 
to rising social inequality and ecological degradation, then the only remedy is to alter the 
balance of power between corporations and other global actors.  This won’t happen with 
civil society sitting down at the negotiating table with Fortune 500 CEOs.  If our aim is to 
advance models of global governance that better protect human rights and ecological 
sustainability, we need to think creatively about how to engage corporate actors in ways 
that don’t privilege the profit motive over other social goals and don’t enable the private 
sector to overwhelm the voices of civil society and advocates of a public sphere.  This 
chapter describes the GC and evaluates its implications for global democracy. 
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The Global Compact 
The Global Compact must be seen as part of a longer-term effort by proponents of 
neoliberal globalization to transform global power relations in ways that advanced their 
vision of economic globalization.  The office was created after a long effort led by 
neoliberal proponents to discredit the United Nations and reduce its role in economic 
policy making.  By the 1970s, Northern business actors found their economic interests 
challenged by a majority of UN member states –many of which were former colonies—
that was articulating demands for a “New International Economic Order.”  They worked 
with Northern governments –especially the United States-- to mute the political impact of 
Third World governments by transforming the structure of the world body in important 
ways.  First, they worked with the U.S. government to eliminate in 1991 the UN’s Center 
on Transnational Corporations, which had been working to enhance Southern 
governments’ leverage in dealings with TNCs and to develop a code of conduct to 
regulate corporate practices.  They also transferred much responsibility for global trade 
negotiations from the UN Conference on Trade and Development to the global financial 
institutions (see, e.g., Bennis 1997; Karliner 1997; Sklair 2001).  At the same time, the 
World Bank and IMF were helping advance a debt crisis among Third World 
governments that created a system of economic subordination that thwarted the political 
ambitions of global South governments (Bello 2003; McMichael 2003).   
Neoliberal proponents also worked through cultural institutions in the United 
States to discredit and undercut legislative support for the United Nations.  Beginning in 
the 1980s, elite social movement organizations1 like the Heritage Foundation and Cato 
Institute published hundreds of reports, op-eds, and other documents admonishing the 
world body.  As Paine observed: 
 
Over the course of more than two decades, neo-liberal propagandists have defined 
the UN as an inefficient and unresponsive bureaucracy, threatening to impose 
itself on the world’s people. Again and again, editorial writers and newscasters 
have repeated the term “vast, bloated bureaucracy,” even though the UN staff is 
actually quite small.  The mass media and the universities embraced these views, 
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especially in the United States, and think-tanks sponsored by wealthy individuals 
and transnational corporations actively developed and disseminated them.  (2000). 
 
These efforts succeeded in generating Congressional support for measures to withhold 
U.S. payments of dues and other assessments to the United Nations, plunging the 
organization into serious financial crisis during much of the 1990s.  The economic 
stranglehold wielded by the United States allowed it to secure important concessions 
from the world body, including the elimination of the Center on Transnational 
Corporations as well as the appointment of a Secretary General more favorable to U.S. 
economic interests.  
 Kofi Annan, a graduate of MIT’s Sloan School of Business, worked to transform 
the UN’s relationship with the business community throughout his tenure as Secretary-
General. In addition to attending private meetings with corporate leaders and the 
International Chamber of Commerce, Annan regularly attended the World Economic 
Forum, an annual gathering of corporate and political elite.  He launched a plan to 
promote business “partnerships” with the UN body, and encouraged all UN agencies to 
cultivate innovative partnerships with business as a means of securing new resources and 
legitimacy for the organization.  The Global Compact became a central part of this 
strategy to bring businesses into the UN orbit, and Annan used his office to amplify 
attention to the initiative. 
 The Global Compact, or GC, seeks to promote global governance of corporate 
practices through normative pressure.  It works to sensitize corporate leaders to the values 
and norms of the UN system and to encourage them to implement its ten “core 
principles”  in their corporate practices.  GC Partners must agree to: 
 
1) Support and respect for the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights;  
2) Take steps to ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
3) Uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining;  
4) Eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labour;  
5) Work towards the effective abolition of child labour;  
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6) Eliminate discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; 
7) Support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;  
8) Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility;  
9) Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies; and 
10) Work to eliminate all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery. 
 
To participate in the GC, a company must: 1) send a letter to the UN Secretary-General 
expressing support for the GC and its principles and an intention to integrate GC 
principles into the corporation’s day-to-day operations; 2) publicly advocate for the GC 
and its principles in its publications; 3) publish in its annual report a summary of how the 
company is working to advance the GC principles; and 4) participate in GC policy 
dialogues and operational activities.2   
The GC essentially seeks to create “learning networks” made up of corporate, 
civil society, and governmental actors that work to sensitize corporate leaders to the 
values and norms of the UN.  Corporate “partners” are asked to submit case studies of 
how they’ve attempted to implement Global Compact principles, and "the hope and 
expectation is that good practices will help to drive out bad ones through the power of 
dialogue, transparency, advocacy and competition" (Ruggie 2002).  The UN uses its 
convening power to help bring civil society and governmental actors together to discuss 
ways to improve links between business practices and human rights.  Examples of “best 
practices” are highlighted on the GC website as models for other corporations to follow.   
The GC organizes regular “Global Policy Dialogues” on globalization and 
corporate citizenship to help partners internalize human rights and other global norms.  
Such meetings are held in cooperation with other UN agencies and some civil society 
groups.   In addition to these annual meetings, the GC supports network-building between 
corporations and local and national associations working to promote socially responsible 
corporate practices.   
What is quite clear from the language of GC proponents and from the literature on 
the GC website, however, is that the GC does not aim to challenge the market ideology 
that is inherent in predominant models of economic globalization.  To the contrary, it 
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draws heavily on the market logic and seeks to make the UN a more direct proponent of 
global markets as solutions to contemporary crises.  As he promoted the initiative, Kofi 
Annan justified the GC saying that, in the political arena the UN can “help make the case 
for and maintain an environment which favours trade and open markets” (quoted in 
Martens, 2007).  In advance of its 2007 “Global Leaders Summit,” the GC posted a link 
to a Goldman Sachs report touting the competitive advantages seen by companies 
implementing social and environmental practices into their operations.3  UN press 
releases for the Summit claimed that the event was about “building the markets of 
tomorrow.”  And key GC architects John G. Ruggie and George Kell routinely use pro-
market language to promote their cause, including this interesting justification: “[o]ne can 
readily appreciate why corporations would be attracted to the Global Compact.  It offers 
one stop-shopping in the three critical areas of greatest external pressure: human rights, 
environment and labor standards, thereby reducing their transaction costs” (2000:20). 
Without rejecting out of hand the market model of economic development, we 
can and should ask whether it is the role of the UN to advocate so directly for this model, 
especially at a time when it has come under considerable scrutiny for its failures to 
promote human well being and environmental sustainability.  Why is it that the GC was 
only introduced after serious challenges to economic globalization have emerged?  
Should any government adopt a single model of development without establishing 
mechanisms to critically evaluate its costs and benefits and to adjudicate among the 
arguments for and against alternatives?  A further problem with the blatantly pro-market 
agenda of the GC is the fact that studies it has commissioned of its partners demonstrate 
that it is these very market principles that are limiting the ability of partners to integrate 
GC goals into their business operations.  A study of GC partners by McKinsey done in 
advance of the 2007 Global Leaders Summit showed that CEOs of corporate partners 
listed the following most common reasons for not systematically implementing GC 
principles (respondents could list multiple answers): 
 
 “Competing strategic priorities” (43%) 
 “Complexity of implementing strategy across various business functions” (39%) 
 “Lack of recognition from the financial markets” (25%)  
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 “Failure to recognize a link to value drivers” (18%) 
 
When we read between the lines of business-speak, it is clear that all of these items signal 
that it is the very principles driving global market competition that undermine the ability 
of the GC to affect corporate behavior.  Somewhat surprisingly, the fourth most common 
answer provided by CEOs to this same question was a desire for a set of common 
standards of social and environmental responsibility.  This suggests that even these 
business leaders recognize the need for more government regulation to counter market 
pressures on social and environmental goods.  The pro-market bias of the GC, however, 
prevents it from addressing the structural or systemic causes of the harmful practices it 
purportedly seeks to limit.   
 While its corporate partners are the centerpiece of the GC, the program also 
invites participation from civil society organizations (including labor) and academic 
institutions at the international and increasingly the national and local levels.  It seeks to 
promote greater cooperation between businesses and civil society groups as a means of 
enhancing corporate social responsibility, and has encouraged the formation of local 
networks to support the GC principles.   However, the success of the GC at engaging 
active civil society participation has been limited, mostly by the refusal of business 
partners to accept more transparency and openness in their reporting on their 
implementation of GC principles.  Civil society partners and critics of the GC alike have 
urged the UN to establish mechanisms for independent monitoring of corporate practice 
rather than to rely solely on the claims of corporate partners about how their practices 
support human rights and environmental sustainability.  But the business community has 
steadfastly rejected any monitoring scheme, insisting that the GC remain a purely 
voluntary program.  As a result, the GC has not seriously challenged “partners” whose 
practices clearly violate the GC and other UN principles.4   
Although some improvements have been made to the GC in response to critics, 
the Global Compact remains problematic for many observers (both inside and outside the 
United Nations) because it allows corporations to claim an allegiance with the UN 
without requiring verifiable measures to ensure that the behavior of corporate “partners” 
is consistent with UN norms.  Business leaders have refused to allow monitoring of their 
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practices, and the GC has not made an effort to push for such measures.  Thus, while 
businesses can gain favorable publicity by joining the Global Compact, they assume no 
costs, since compliance is voluntary.  “Even [George] Soros noted that [the Global 
Compact] was nothing more than corporate image whitewash” (quoted in Robinson 
2004:171).  Activists dubbed the program “blue wash,” since it allows corporations to 
hide unscrupulous behaviors behind the UN’s blue flag (TRAC 2000).  Many member 
governments also remain highly critical of the GC.   This is in part because the process by 
which the initiative was adopted involved no consultation with member governments 
from the Global South, and it amounted to an end-run around the UN General Assembly.  
Critics see the GC as a decoy that corporations and their allies are using to obstruct 
efforts in the UN to more effectively govern their practices (Elson 2004).   
 
The Global Compact and Global Democracy 
The editors of this volume have rightly argued that we need to improve the ways 
we think about democracy and business at the global level (chapter 1, p. 2).  They 
propose a definition of democracy that emphasizes participation, transparency and 
accountability.  Certainly these are crucial elements of any democratic arrangement, and 
they provide useful yardsticks against which we can measure the democratic content of 
the GC.  Our editors have also addressed the question of power, and certainly any 
discussion of the impacts of the GC on democracy would be incomplete without serious 
attention to how it affects the distribution of material and symbolic resources that allow 
different groups to shape policy outcomes. 
 
GC Impacts on Global Power Relations 
The introductory chapter introduced several dimensions of power that are relevant 
to our consideration here.  Behavioral power is the ability of an actor to intervene in 
political processes to obtain policy outcomes favorable to its interests.  The discussion 
above of the historical context of the GC illustrates the power neoliberal globalizers have 
had within global political institutions, and how they used this power to create the GC 
and ensure that it operates in ways consistent with their interests. This power grows 
mainly from their vastly disproportionate control of financial resources, which allow 
 10 
business leaders to devote time and resources to monitoring political developments, 
crafting draft resolutions and proposals for policy initiatives that advance their interests, 
and influencing the agendas as well as the perspectives of policymakers.  The ability to 
hire full-time lobbyists and legal assistants to determine how proposed international 
agreements will impact class interests gives neoliberal globalizers a substantial edge (to 
say the least) in advocating for their interest on the global stage.  In contrast, even 
governments have difficulties supporting technical staff to protect their interests in global 
negotiations (Ostry 2007). 
The GC itself may help amplify the behavioral power of transnational 
corporations by enhancing their formal roles and legitimacy as “partners” in global 
governance.  This is because the United Nations has invited corporate involvement in its 
operations from a position of weakness rather than strength.  It has sought to entice 
corporate players into the UN by offering them use of the “UN brand” to help them 
market their products and services (Kell and Levin 2002; Ruggie 2002).  It has 
acquiesced to corporate pressure and refused to establish corporate monitoring 
procedures in order to secure corporate acceptance of the GC program.  And it has 
allowed corporate players to thwart discussions about other initiatives to more effectively 
govern corporate practices by claiming that such discussions duplicate efforts already 
being taken in the GC (Bendell 2004; Hobbs, Khan, Posner, and Roth 2003; Martens 
2003).   
Within the GC, then, corporations have become players that should be consulted 
about policy rather than regulated by it.  The GC explicitly disavows any responsibility 
for monitoring or ensuring corporate compliance with global norms, thereby allowing the 
persistence of a governance gap with respect to the application of international law.  
Since international law as it is currently written applies only to states, only states can be 
held accountable to it.  However, as corporations have eclipsed the power and capacity of 
many states,5 they have become both capable of serious violations of international law 
and immune from prosecution for such violations. 
While it strengthens the power of corporations, the GC simultaneously diminishes 
the power of civil society. By privileging corporations as central players within the 
United Nations, the GC helps marginalize civil society voices while promoting the idea 
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that “the business of government is business” and that the “business of business is 
government” (Hertz 2001: 166).  In other words, to justify their failure to take on a role 
of governing corporations, the GC has helped make corporations appear as legitimate 
representatives of broad public interests who deserve a special role in global decision 
making.  Civil society actors, in contrast, have been marginalized and overshadowed in 
the United Nations because of their inability to compete with the agenda-setting and 
ideological capacities of a more readily coordinated community of business actors.6  To 
further marginalize civil society actors from engagement in global economic policy 
discussions, the GC co-sponsored with corporate partners a purportedly scientific study 
of NGO accountability that was harshly (and unfairly) critical of NGOs that challenged 
economic globalization and that offered a decidedly pro-business perspective on the role 
of civil society (Smith 2008: chapter 4).7 
In addition to behavioral power, the GC also fails to challenge and possibly even 
strengthens the structural power of business actors.  Structural power was defined in 
chapter 1 as flowing from the dependence of governments on economic growth; the 
ability of businesses to pit governments against each other in competition for investment 
dollars and jobs; and from prevailing business-friendly cultural and institutional 
tendencies such as individualism, consumerism, uncritical support for economic growth, 
and hostility towards public sector.  Again, by providing corporations with a privileged 
position within the UN system without requiring verifiable compliance with UN norms, 
the GC provides tacit support for the model of economic organization that reinforces 
corporate power over public institutions and that subordinates public policy to markets.  
Elson refers to this as the "privatization of relations between the UN and big 
corporations,” which she defines as “a process wherein UN agencies no longer see it as 
their role to strengthen member-states in their dealings with corporations, but rather 
facilitate the self-regulation of corporations and promote bilateral deals between UN 
agencies and corporations that bypass member-states" (Daly 2002;  2004:52-3; Mander 
and Goldsmith 1996). 
While some might argue that the “learning networks” established within the GC 
can contribute to changes in the values and practices of corporations, nothing in the 
current procedures of the GC is likely to lead to any serious challenges to the cultural and 
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competitive logics that define how corporations behave.  While corporate players might 
clean up their images and possibly even some of their practices, in the end they still 
operate in a global economic system that values profit over other social values.  Because 
the UN has engaged the business community as a supplicant rather than as a king, the GC 
is unlikely to advance global democracy or serve as a model for global economic 
governance.  To do so, it would have to intervene to alter the balance of power among 
global actors—in particular to strengthen the hands of governments and civil society 
relative to corporations and to subject markets to democratic governance. 
 
GC Impacts on Democratic Practices 
 Clearly power is closely related to the following discussion of the procedural 
impacts of the GC as they relate to global democracy.  Disempowered actors are less able 
to participate, to demand transparency in the practices of more powerful actors, and to 
hold more powerful actors accountable to international norms.  Thus, to the extent that 
the GC fails to remedy the significant inequalities of power between corporations and 
civil society and between corporations and governments, it is not likely to significantly 
advance these three measures of global democracy.  Nevertheless, it is worth devoting 
some attention to the question of how the GC might impact each area. 
Does the GC enhance participation in global policy making?  The first question 
we must ask is whether the GC provides opportunities for more people to be involved in 
policy discussions related to how global and national economies are organized.  A related 
but often neglected question in this regard is how particular institutional arrangements 
affect the possibilities for economic participation, or the opportunities for people to 
exercise real choice in decisions about how they participate in the economy (see, e.g., 
Miller 2006; Mander 1996; Daly 2002). 
   The first question about the participation in policy debates is somewhat difficult 
to address for two reasons.  First is the lack of detailed information about the 
extensiveness and representativeness of participation in GC policy dialogues and in the 
local GC networks.  A second problem is that we are unable to evaluate whether the GC 
model is better at expanding participation than some alternative model for governing 
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corporate practices.  Nevertheless, I will try to present some evidence about the 
participation in economic policy dialogues that can be attributed to the GC. 
 The GC currently claims –after nearly seven years of operation-- to have 3800 
participants, including around 2800 active businesses.  GC proponents argue that these 
business partners would otherwise be disengaged from the UN system and their practices 
regarding human rights and other global norms would remain outside of the UN arena.  
But when we consider that there are more than 70,000 transnational corporations 
worldwide with hundreds of thousands of affiliates and millions of suppliers (Manalsuren 
2007; Utting 2007:699-700), this figure represents a mere drop in the bucket of the 
potential corporate participants in the GC.  Moreover, critics of the GC note that the 
program’s focus on the larger, transnational companies and their national affiliates 
overlooks the corporate trend towards subcontracting production to small, localized 
enterprises that engage more precarious forms of employment and the casualisation of 
labor (Utting 2007: 700).  In short, corporate participation in the GC represents a very 
small tip of a very large iceberg.  While some might argue that it is better to engage these 
few than none, we might also ask whether alternative institutional arrangements—i.e. 
those not dependent upon corporate acquiescence but upon government authority to 
regulate corporate practices and empower citizens--could achieve greater corporate 
participation. 
 We should also consider what participation in the GC actually means in 
qualitative terms.  Do large corporations really take their obligations as partners in the 
GC seriously?  There is some evidence that speaks to this question, and not very 
favorably.  For instance, in 2007 the GC released its first study of participants, which was 
based in part on an analysis of an anonymous, online survey.  The response rate achieved 
by the survey was just 15% (400 companies), far lower than most respected social 
science studies and also much lower than one would expect given the symbolic and 
material resources that were behind the study.  Also, since 2006, the GC has withdrawn 
the memberships of 778 partners for their failure to file the requisite performance reports.  
Given that there are now just 2800 corporate partners, this is a rather high attrition rate.  
The recent study of the GC reported that of participants who were in the program for 
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more than two years, 45% of Northern and 65-70% of Southern partners are “inactive” or 
“non-communicating.”8 
 Civil society participation in the GC is similarly miniscule.  As of July 2007, 
around 900 participants in the GC were from civil society, labor, and academic 
organizations.  Just 36 “global” NGOs were listed as civil society partners to the GC. 
These included some groups more closely aligned with the corporate and government 
sectors than with civil society, such as the World Economic Forum, the New York Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Danish Institute for HR, among others.  
A much larger list of several hundred “national” NGOs were listed, but it is not clear 
what their “participation” means.9  This figure is a similarly tiny proportion of the many 
thousands of civil society groups that have participated in global conferences and the 
hundreds of thousands of participants in the World Social Forum process (Smith and 
Karides et al. 2008; Willetts 1996).10  We should note, too, that this number is especially 
low, given that one important inducement for civil society participation in the GC is the 
promise of funding from corporate partners, which are encouraged to engage in joint 
initiatives with civil society groups to help implement the GC principles.11 
 The next important question that is often neglected in discussions of democracy is 
the extent to which particular institutional arrangements promote or limit more expansive 
participation in economic life.  Most market proponents assume that free, open markets 
provide equal access to all participants, but considerable evidence challenges this 
assumption (see, e.g., New Economics Foundation 2006; UNDP, 2005).  If economic 
globalization is the process of integrating local and national economies into a single, 
globalized market, then it effectively involves the transfer of economic control from local 
to global level actors.  When countries organize their economies to respond to global 
markets, they shift land and other resources towards production that is responsive to 
global rather than local demand.  Thus we find growing numbers of countries with 
tremendous food production capabilities suffering from national food insecurity 
(McMichael 2004, 2003).  The choices of jobs available to residents are also lost, as 
globe-trotting companies can cross borders in search of the cheapest workers, following 
the economic notion of “comparative advantage.”  Daly describes the (il)logical 
conclusion to policies that emphasize specialization for global market competitiveness: 
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In Uruguay, for example, everyone would have to be either a shepherd or a 
cowboy in conformity with the dictates of competitive advantage in the global 
market. Everything else should be imported in exchange for beef, mutton, wool, 
and leather. Any Uruguayan who wants to play in a symphony orchestra or be an 
airline pilot should emigrate. (Daly 2002:3)  
 
The rise of precarious labor and the casualization of labor, which has been enabled by the 
weakening of unions under economic globalization reflects a considerable loss in the 
ability of citizens to participate in the economic and social lives of their communities 
(Klein 1999; Moody 1997; Munck 2002).  To the extent that the GC fails to challenge the 
power of the corporate sector and even lends legitimacy to the market-oriented model of 
economic globalization, it helps to reduce the effective participation of civil society. 
Does the GC enhance transparency in global decision making?  The GC should 
in theory contribute to greater transparency in global affairs by requiring corporate 
partners to provide information about how they are trying to implement global principles.  
As is stated above, partners are required to submit annual “communications on progress” 
(COPs) to the GC website.  We can also assume that they have an incentive to do so, 
since it can contribute to favorable public relations and corporate visibility with little 
cost.  Table 2 shows the numbers of COPs filed by corporate partners to the GC between 
2002 and 2007. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 shows that the number of corporate partners complying with the GC reporting 
requirement appears to have peaked in 2005 at just over 1200.  In 2006, despite a 
presumed growth in the numbers of GC corporate partners, the number dropped to under 
1000 reports filed, and the numbers for 2007 don’t seem to be on track to reverse the 
decline.12 Similarly, the number of reports that were deemed notable as models of how to 
report on progress and/or how to implement GC principles13 declined sharply since 2003, 
the first year for which complete records were available. 
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 This record raises questions about the ability of the GC to generate greater 
transparency in global economic governance.  Given that partners are not required to 
demonstrate that their actual practices match the claims made in these reports,14 their 
failure to submit reports in a timely way is rather surprising.   
 Complicating the question of transparency, moreover, is the absence of any 
attempt by the UN to monitor the extent to which corporate words match their deeds.  As 
Utting notes, most independent analyses have found a “[s]erious gap between stated 
intentions and actual implementation of [corporate social responsibility]” (Utting 2007: 
700).  Most civil society partners have remained highly critical of the absence of 
monitoring and enforcement of principles, and Ramesh Singh, chief executive of 
ActionAid, a major development NGO, called the project a happy-go-lucky club for its 
reliance on purely voluntary compliance (Capedevila 2007).  The UN’s Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, called for active resistance to the GC 
because it was being used as a public relations operation by major TNCs (Capedevila 
2007).  In short, it is clear that if the GC does not establish measures that enhance the 
credibility of corporate claims, the value of COPs for enhancing transparency is minimal 
to none.   
 Beyond these details of reporting and monitoring compliance with global norms, 
we must also ask about the extent to which the GC framework allows for full 
transparency in terms of the discussion of the relative merits of market-based 
development models for the global community.  Utting notes the irony of the fact that 
companies might be deemed model citizens in terms of their performance measures as 
outlined by corporate social responsibility schemes, while at the same time they are 
“lobbying forcefully for macroeconomic, labour market and other social policies 
associated with forms of labour market flexibilisation, deregulation […] that can result in 
the weakening of institutions and systems of social protection” (Utting 2007: 701).  
Schemes like the GC might generate some improvements in corporate practices “without 
questioning various contradictory policies and practices that can have perverse 
consequences in terms of equality and equity” (Utting 2007: 701).  The GC thus 
obfuscates the social impacts of corporate practices. 
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Does the GC enhance accountability of powerful actors? Political accountability 
can be defined as “being obliged to explain one's actions to others and being held 
responsible to a broad-based public" (Wapner 2002: 59).15  While the failures of 
transparency described above suggest that little is being done through the GC to facilitate 
accountability of powerful actors, there are other elements of the GC that we can examine 
in an attempt to assess its prospects for strengthening accountability in the global system.   
A look at the history of the GC provides insights into its failures as a mechanism 
for increasing global accountability.  As was mentioned earlier, the GC was formed at the 
initiative of the Secretary General, and largely due to pressure from a single—albeit very 
powerful—UN member state, the United States.  While the move was certainly within the 
realm of the Secretary General’s authority, it bypassed the usual procedures for 
establishing new offices to address important global problems.  The General Assembly is 
the body authorized to launch major initiatives, and certainly any substantial UN project 
would require the support of most of its member states.  More importantly, it ensured that 
the GC would not be shaped by the preferences of a majority of member governments 
that had already signaled their interest in strengthening the UN’s ability to regulate TNCs 
and strengthen member governments’ negotiating power relative to them.  And although 
the GC operates in their name, the GC is not accountable to member states.  
This failure of accountability to the full membership of the UN in questions about 
how the UN should relate to global corporations has prevented the GC from being linked 
with other UN negotiations and conventions.   For instance, References to the GC were 
deleted from final declaration at the Copenhagen +5 Social Summit (Elson 2004:51).  
And a search of the UN website revealed that the only references to the Global Compact 
were by the GC office.16  Given that the GC is being promoted as the key process for 
addressing the crucial question of how to apply international law to the practices of 
transnational corporations, we would certainly expect more widespread incorporation of 
the GC program into the wider UN system.  The fact that, seven years after its launch, it 
remains such an isolated entity shows that it has little legitimacy within even the UN 
itself.   
Another important failure of accountability in the GC is that there is no procedure 
for verifying the claims made by participants, nor is there evidence of an attempt to 
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develop one.  The GC website indicates that the office makes no attempt to verify the 
accuracy of claims made in partners’ Communications of Progress, but it does not 
provide space for even its own civil society participants to comment on corporate 
partners’ claims.17  Under pressure to remedy this serious shortfall, the GC adopted a 
series of “integrity measures” in 2005, which included a provision allowing third parties 
to report serious violations of the GC principles to the GC office (Global Compact 2005).  
However, the new measures provide only for internal negotiations among GC and 
corporate entities involved, preventing complainants from making public statements 
regarding the matter “until it is resolved.”  So while there is some effort to hold GC 
members accountable, the audience of accountability—and its potential impact on 
corporate practices-- is extremely limited. 
The GC’s limited attempt to hold partners accountable means it will not have a 
substantial impact on the practices of its corporate partners.  And the evidence we have to 
date suggests that this expectation is being borne out, as “relatively few of the over 2500 
participating companies provide comprehensive evidence of compliance with the 10 
principles” (Utting 2007:704).  And a study of GC participants conducted in 2004 found 
that only 6% of participating companies were taking actions that they would not have 
taken if they remained outside the initiative (Blair, Bugg-Levine, and Rippin 2004).18  
Another problem the GC introduces is that it is undermining other efforts to 
advance a more rigorous model for effective corporate governance within the United 
Nations that builds upon existing foundations.  For instance, the GC completely bypasses 
existing arrangements, such as the International Labor Organization, which already has 
established norms relating to the treatment and rights of workers.  By establishing a 
completely separate framework of reference, the GC shifts the attention of policy makers 
away from efforts to strengthen existing normative commitments and mechanisms for 
improving compliance and towards the building of entirely new institutional 
arrangements.  In this case, it is serving to marginalize important elements of the UN –
including member states--from discussions of global governance. 
The proposed “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regard to human rights” (UN Draft Norms for Business) 
are being advanced by a coalition of civil society groups including Rights and 
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Accountability in Development (RAID), Amnesty International, and the Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights Action Network, together with other corporate accountability groups 
and coalitions (International Network for Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2005; 
Amnesty International 2004).  The initiative has support within the United Nations and 
from some member governments.19  The Draft Norms for Business have already been 
adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
a first step in achieving a binding international treaty.20  But the GC draws substantial 
attention away from the need for more regulation of corporate activity and it is used to 
justify arguments by corporate actors that self-regulation works and that mechanisms 
beyond the GC are unnecessary.  Because the GC involves no oversight mechanism, it 
can provide no credible evidence that voluntary compliance actually works, but it has, 
nevertheless, effectively slowed down efforts to promote changes in corporate practices.  
Although GC proponents argue that the initiative is designed to complement and promote 
stronger regulatory mechanisms,21 they haven’t done much to either support specific 
initiatives like the draft Norms for business or to encourage their “partners” to accept 
these, and most evidence points to the contrary. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The above analysis shows serious limitations of the Global Compact as a model 
for global governance of business.  These limitations emerge largely from the fact that 
the project itself results from the disproportionate power of corporations relative to other 
actors in the global system—including governments and international officials, as well as 
civil society.  I conclude from this analysis that a more democratic and more effective 
system of corporate governance is impossible without efforts to address the inequities of 
power in the global system.   
 The GC is not likely to provide a solid foundation for change in this direction, in 
part because it is founded upon and shaped by these very power inequities that allow 
violations of social and ecological norms to continue.  It reflects the disproportionate 
“behavioral power” of business, since corporate lobbyists were able to design the project 
as an attempt to pre-empt other initiatives within the United Nation to regulate the 
practices of transnational corporations. They advanced the initiative outside normal UN 
 20 
procedures by enlisting the United States government in its effort to promote a more 
corporate-friendly United Nations.  Thus, the behavioral power of business over-rode the 
interests and preferences of a majority of UN member governments.  Without efforts to 
bring legitimate authorities into discussions of global corporate governance, the GC can 
only rely on the continued dominance of corporate power over other global players.  
Nevertheless, it seems that such power is coming under growing challenges, and the 
introduction of the GC itself came largely as a response to such challenges.22 
The GC could be created with such weak mechanisms for ensuring accountability 
to UN member governments and to the global public because it was launched at a time 
when proponents of neoliberal globalization were able to exert a highly disproportionate 
influence on global policy.  I noted above how the U.S. played a key role in pressing the 
UN Secretary General to launch the GC initiative in order to pre-empt other attempts to 
regulate transnational corporations.  It is also important to note that the GC initiative was 
launched at a time when corporate power relative to workers had been rising sharply as a 
result of global neoliberal policies.  In many countries, the percentage of national income 
going to corporate profits had risen while workers income from wages and salaries  
declined (O'Brien 2004, 2002; Utting 2007).  This growing inequality of power between 
corporations and civil society actors reflects an aspect of structural power, and it further 
diminishes the possibilities for effective accountability in global economic governance.  
Any attempt to remedy the accountability gap in the GC would require steps to alter the 
inequalities between corporate actors and workers around the world. 
 But the GC is also problematic if our aim is to enhance prospects for human rights 
and environmental norms, given that it is grounded in and replicates the structural power 
of business actors.  I discussed above how it reinforces the market ideology and 
undermines arguments of those criticizing neoliberal approaches to global integration.  It 
fails to question the assumption that governments’ main task is to promote economic 
growth, and therefore it reinforces the power of large corporate actors vis-à-vis national 
governments.  It also fails to address the more systemic problem of how the globalization 
of markets encourages standards-lowering competition between governments in the areas 
of human rights and environmental protection.  Effective governments are necessary for 
defining and enforcing international norms, and thus global institutions such as the UN 
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must work to reverse this imbalance of power that has undermined national and global 
governance.  
 Another area of corporate structural power the GC has reinforced is the promotion 
of business-friendly cultural and institutional tendencies within the United Nations.  It 
has allowed corporate partners to develop privileged relationships with governments, and 
to use these relationships to shape the global agenda and marginalize the voices of less 
powerful actors (Korten 1997a; 1997b).  In fact, the initiative itself is a conscious effort 
to integrate business ideologies into the United Nations.  Thus, it has supported the values 
of individualism, consumerism, and uncritical support for economic growth, while 
promoting and even legitimating hostility towards the public sector.23  This undermines 
possibilities for allowing civil society to become an effective counterweight to corporate 
domination of society. 
A key idea behind the GC is the notion that contemporary society requires more 
complex, networked forms of governance to address the problems we face today.  
Governments alone cannot solve these problems, and they must work in conjunction with 
civil society and corporate actors.24  The initiative envisions a system of “checks and 
balances,” whereby civil society groups would be expected to “substitute” for 
governments to help enforce the “self regulation” by monitoring corporate practices.  
(Kell and Ruggie 2000).  And although civil society groups are being asked to help 
govern this system, they are given no resources or support in doing so.  In fact, the GC 
itself has both actively and passively served to weaken civil society groups by helping to 
strengthen the hand of corporate actors while -- in order to sustain corporations’ interests 
in partnership-- actively working to constrain and to delegitimize the many groups that 
are critical of its corporate “partners.”  How, for instance, can the public make sense of 
the discrepancies between claims of NGOs and those of corporate UN “Partners” when 
the GC refuses to implement procedures for monitoring compliance with GC norms and 
refuses to evaluate competing claims and evidence?  
Similarly, governments are also being asked to contribute resources to the efforts 
of corporations to strengthen their voluntary compliance with GC principles, but they are 
not being provided with the material or symbolic resources necessary to be leaders for 
global norms.25  The exclusion of the UN General Assembly from the process of creating 
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the GC initiative also challenges the authority of member states relative to corporations, 
who were being invited to consult with UN Secretariat officials about global corporate 
governance matters while the UN General Assembly was closed out.  It is hard to 
imagine that many member governments will want to support the GC after having their 
own authority rebuffed in this way. 
 
What are the alternatives for global corporate governance? 
A key failure in the GC is not its notion of how networks of actors can produce 
learning and improve corporate practices and governance (Martens 2007).  Indeed, if it 
actually did facilitate networks where corporate actors, states, and civil society groups 
would actually “share power,” it could be effective.  But the crucial flaw in the initiative 
is its failure to ask how the networks it promotes can achieve a system of “checks and 
balances” without confronting fundamental imbalances of power that undermine 
transparency, accountability and democracy more generally (Knight and Smith 
Forthcoming).  For instance, the failure of the GC to incorporate any mechanism for 
monitoring corporate compliance with its principles means that the “learning network’s” 
system of “checks and balances” can never be balanced.  As GC proponents rightly point 
out, “[o]f course, the Global Compact will never be capable of preventing companies 
from issuing misleading statements...” But they nevertheless “encourage the public to 
consult official Global Compact literature and to perform its own due diligence when 
possible" (Kell and Levin 2002).  By bowing to corporate resistance to any mechanisms 
for ensuring compliance, the GC has limited the capacities of civil society groups to 
counter-balance the enormous influence of corporations.   
Given the extremes of global inequality, the checked-and-balanced, network 
learning process envisioned by Ruggie and his collaborators is doomed to failure unless it 
is accompanied by efforts to fundamentally reorganize power relations within the 
network and the wider global system.  This seems an enormous task, but it is one that 
only the United Nations and its member governments can hope to undertake.  But it is 
unlikely to happen within the GC framework, and it seems the best approach is to move 
beyond any discussion of the GC in favor of processes that have emerged from a more 
representative process within the United Nations.  The process of governing global 
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business practices should begin with an authoritative mandate that grows from a 
transparent and democratic process, and thus the GC framework needs to be abandoned. 
The idea that businesses should be “partners” with the UN suggests an inappropriate 
parity of status not only between corporations and the UN but also between corporations 
and governments.  Civil society groups have a far longer track record of helping support 
and advance the values and aims of the UN Charter, and they should not be marginalized 
by a misplaced optimism that corporations can be taught to be better global citizens 
(Beausang 2003; Smith 2006)?26   
If we seek a global order governed by principles of democracy, human rights, and 
sustainability, we need to look critically at how existing institutions reinforce this vision 
as opposed to the market-globalization vision of neoliberal globalizers.  The UN must see 
itself in the role of helping states govern transnational businesses, and an important step 
in this direction is to alter the modes of thinking that force discussions about respect for 
human rights and other global norms to be “refracted through the calculation of corporate 
profits" (Elson 2004:60-61).  This will require a conscious effort to reorganize political 
power in the global system so that civil society and national governments are empowered, 
charged with the task of promoting and protecting a culture of peace and human rights 
over the existing, growth-oriented model of social organization.27  This follows the 
analyses of Karl Polanyi and of many contemporary analysts who argue for a “re-
embedding” of the global economy in a system of norms and values that emerge from a 
democratic global society (Elson 2004:60; Munck 2002; Smith 2008).  Substantial 
material and authoritative resources must be shifted towards states and civil society if this 
is to happen. 
The Global Compact is ultimately an arrangement that privatizes relations 
between the UN and transnational corporations, thereby insulating corporations from 
public scrutiny while tying the hands of the UN, thereby limiting its capacities to ensure 
the implementation of international law and norms.  It is reflects an elite model of 
governance, which assumes that business leaders and policy experts are best equipped to 
determine how society should be governed, and that democratic processes and public 
scrutiny are inefficient and counter-productive to the task of governance.28 While such a 
model may be appealing in many ways, it cannot survive over the long-term, as it will 
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ultimately be challenged for its lack of legitimacy.  While its goal of educating and 
providing corporations with models for better corporate practices may indeed help realize 
the principles it promotes, without a structure that subordinates corporations to 
governments and to public scrutiny and democratic accountability, it will not 
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Table 2: Global Compact  
Communications of Progress (COP) Filings  
2002-2007 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Number of COPs filed 35 206 696 1204 977 377 
Percent notable COPs 0 68% 11% 7% 4% 1% 
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1 This term is used by Sklair (1997). 
2 Nongovernmental organizations or NGOs, in contrast, must go through an elaborate 
accreditation process that is subject to review by a committee of member state 
representatives.  They must demonstrate for this committee that their work contributes to 
the work of the United Nations, among other requirements.   
3 The GC website announcement proclaimed that “an increasing number of business 
leaders see corporate responsibility as a way to compete successfully and to build trust 
with stakeholders – and that sustainability front-runners in a range of industries can 
generate higher stock prices. 
4 In 2005, the GC responded to these criticisms by establishing “integrity measures” that 
specified that GC partners that failed to file the required reports to the GC would have 
their memberships suspended Global Compact. 2005. "Global Compact Integrity 
Measures.".  It also established procedures through which complaints could be filed 
against partners for alleged violations of GC principles.  I address this further later in the 
chapter.  
5 Of the world’s top 50 economies (based on revenues) in the early 2000s, just 15 were 
national governments and 35 were corporations (Sklair 2002). 
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6 The fact that business actors share a common interest in securing global rules that 
enable and enhance their ability to accumulate profits makes if far easier to coordinate 
their global strategy—even without formal efforts to do so—than it is for civil society 
groups that are poorly funded and focused on a wide array of issues. 
7 The study, “The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change” was co-sponsored by a 
business lobby, Sustainability, the UN Global Compact, and UN Environment 
Programme, along with business “partners” such as Dow Chemical.  
8An active partner is one that has produced a COP within 2 years of joining the Global 
Compact or within 1 year of its previous COP. 
9 A review of the list of civil society participants as well as of some of these participants’ 
websites suggests that their identification with the GC may have come from their 
participation in policy dialogues and other GC-sponsored events.  In other words, it is 
more the convening power of the UN than the compelling nature of the GC program that 
appears to be inducing civil society participation in the program.  Many groups have 
signed public statements criticizing the GC for its failure to monitor corporate practices. 
10 The numbers of participants in the most recent (2nd) Global Compact Leaders Summit 
in 2007 showed similar patterns of participation.  A total of 1,027 people registered for 
the Summit -- 638 from companies, 95 from government entities, 76 from international 
organizations, 65 from international business organizations, 62 from international NGOs, 
45 from academia, 28 from the Global Compact network, 13 from foundations and five 
from international labor organizations. 
11 For instance, civil society groups can receive corporate grants for running training 
programs for business leaders in environmental sustainability or human rights protection. 
12 This pattern mirrors analyses by other scholars (see, e.g. Bendell 2004; Martens 2003).  
13 Notable COPs are chosen because they represent “emerging best practices in 
communicating progress.” In particular, these COPs include notable examples of one or 
all of the following:  1) a statement of continued support for the Global Compact from the 
Chief Executive Officer, Chairperson or other senior executive; 2) references, links or 
descriptions of policies, commitments, and systems the company has created in order to 
implement the Global Compact principles in its operations; 3) a description of actions 
taken in implementing the Principles and/or in furthering broader UN goals; 4) indicators 
that are used to determine success and/or failure in meeting the company’s corporate 
citizenship goals; 5) information about progress made and/or future plans with respect to 
all ten Global Compact principles; 6) a description of how the COP is being disseminated 
among the company’s stakeholders. 
14 The GC website includes a disclaimer noting that the accuracy of partners’ claims is 
not verified by the GC. 
15 Wapner discusses accountability as it relates to governmental and civil society actors, 
but his conceptualization and analysis is applicable here as well. 
16 The search was conducted on July 19, 2007.  Examples of the handful of items that this 
search of the UN website produced include an office of procurement document urging all 
vendors to join GC, and a press release promoting a new, ‘GC-branded’ Sri Lankan tea. 
17 In contrast, the ILO has online business and social initiatives database that 
includes corporate claims as well as third party evaluations (Elson 2004). If the aim of the 
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GC is to make corporate practice conform to global norms, it is crucial that some effort 
be made for greater accountability, and the ILO practice can serve as a model.   
18 The McKinsey survey included 311 respondents, drawn from around 1800 GC partners 
(a 17% response rate). No further details are known about the survey methodology, and 
therefore it is impossible to determine the possible effect of selection bias in survey 
results.  I suspect that respondents would be more engaged in the GC process and more 
likely to report its impact on practices, and therefore this very low figure suggests that the 
GC is not having much impact on corporate practices.  Responses relating to how GC 
participation affected partners’ practices were as follows: No changes in practices since 
joining: 33%; Change would have occurred anyway 27%; Change would have happened, 
but participation significantly facilitated change 34%; Change would have been difficult 
to implement without participation 4%; Change would not have happened without 
participation 2%. 
19 Many civil society partners in the GC support the Global Norms for Business, arguing 
that the GC should be seen as simply a first step towards a more comprehensive system 
of corporate governance.  They argue that serious steps are needed to monitor the 
practices of companies to ensure compliance with international law. 
20 The Draft “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 26 
August 2003) was prepared in the UN Sub- commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, the broader UN Commission on Human Rights has challenged the 
legal standing of this document since it did not explicitly commission the draft. 
21 For instance, its recent first Annual Report stated that the program aims to continue to 
revise and strengthen its communication practices in order to “Positioning the Global 
Compact as a frame of reference for other initiatives and explore stronger linkages with 
implementation, accountability and certification schemes.”  (p. 54) It is uncertain, how 
serious this statement is, given the limited corporate participation in even the existing 
minimalist, voluntary codes and the vociferous corporate opposition to any more binding 
arrangements. 
22 In his statements launching the GC initiative, Kofi Annan made this point explicitly.  
He argued that corporations had to limit their more destructive practices and take other 
steps to manage their public image, as massive protests were growing at the sites of 
global financial meetings of the G8, World Bank, and later the World Trade 
Organization. 
23 For instance, as was discussed above, the GC co-sponsored a “study” of NGO 
accountability by a corporate PR firm, SustainAbility, which challenged the legitimacy of 
all NGOs that questioned market-based globalization.  And in their defense of the GC 
initiative, John Ruggie and Georg Kell have offered dismissive caricatures of the GC’s 
civil society critics as “small, radical, and single-issue” NGOs that are bent on 
confrontation rather than cooperation (Kell and Ruggie 2000). 
24 This is an argument being advanced in numerous places, and is sometimes expressed in 
terms of “public-private partnerships.”  Some more critical analyses emphasize the ways 
networks can be structured to address the need for more democracy both in terms of 
citizen-state relations and in inter-state contexts (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000; United 
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Nations 2004; World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization 2004; 
Slaughter 2004). 
25 See the “Summary of Ministerial Roundtable on the role of Governments in promoting 
Responsible Corporate Citizenship” from the 2007 Global Leadership Summit of the 
Global Compact (at http://www.globalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/ 
Role_of_Governments_Chairs_summary.pdf) 
26 Beausang analyzes partnership arrangements between private and public sector actors, 
showing that asymmetries of power make such arrangements problematic for 
development.  She sees a need to enhance the role of international agencies and NGOs 
relative to corporations in the GC structure and to incorporate disincentives for 
noncompliance into the GC. 
27 For details about the UN-supported concept of the culture of peace, along with its 
defining features, see http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/. 
28Scholar and activist David Korten likened the arrangement to fascism: "The defining 
structure of fascist regimes is a corporate dominated alliance between big business and 
big government to support the expansion of corporate empires" (quoted in Millen et al. 
2000).  
